Tag Archives: moral hazard

The ECB’s Three Mistakes in the Greek Debt Crisis

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By now just about everybody agrees that the European bailout of Greece has failed:  The debt will have to be restructured.    As has been evident for well over a year, it is not possible to think of a plausible combination of Greek budget balance, sovereign risk premium, and economic growth rates that imply anything other than an explosive path for the future ratio of debt to GDP.

There is plenty of blame to go around.  But three big mistakes can be attributed to the European leadership.  This includes the European Central Bank – surprisingly, in that the ECB has otherwise been the most competent and successful of Europe-wide institutions. read more

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The Dodd Bill: CoCo’s? Fine; Hobble the Fed? Don’t Do It.

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The National Journal asks views on a recent proposal for financial reform:    “The Dodd bill on financial regulatory reform embraces a supposed solution to the ‘Too Big To Fail’ conundrum: Contingent Convertible Bonds, or CoCos, which turn into equity once a bank’s capital falls below a certain level.    

My response:

I do think that measures such as the Contingent Convertible Bonds would be a useful step. Some argue that it would be hard to know when to invoke the contingency clause.  It strikes me that this argument largely vanishes when one realizes that the clause would of necessity be invoked by the time we got to the stage of a Bear Stearns or Lehman Brothers bankruptcy. CoCos would not go very far in themselves toward comprehensive reform of the financial system, if that is the goal.  But then no single policy measure would do that.  I agree with Gillian Tett: “In theory, I think that CoCos certainly could be a useful additional to banks’ tool kits. However, in practice, the contagion risk suggests it would be dangerous to rely too heavily on an exclusive diet of CoCos for any policy ‘fix’.”  read more

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Investment Banks, River Banks, and Moral Hazard

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Quite a few excellent economists are worried about moral hazard in financial markets.   Vince Reinhart wrote a Wall Street Journal column rebuking his former bosses after the Bear Stearns intervention: “…the Federal Reserve’s action can only be viewed as rewarding bad behavior.”  Ken Rogoff recently wrote in a Financial Times column, “it is important to be tougher in busts, so that investors and company executives have cause to pay serious attention to risks. If poorly run financial institutions are not allowed to close their doors during recessions, when exactly are they going to be allowed to fail?”    read more

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