Category Archives: trade

Trump’s far out negotiating positions

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March 6, 2025 — I didn’t think Trump would actually follow through with his threatened 25 % tariffs on imports from Canada and Mexico on March 4. I thought that even he would be forced to confront the harm that they would cause for the US economy and would have to back off. When March 4 came, it looked like I was wrong. But today’s news from the White House suggests that perhaps I wasn’t so wrong after all.

1. Staking out a negotiating position?

In trade policy, as in other areas, pundits have been hard put to distill a “method to the madness” from the torrent of moves that US President Donald Trump has announced during his first six weeks in office. Typical declarations — such as his designs on Greenland, Panama, or Canada — are so far out as to seem at first like he is joking. But he sticks with them, requiring a radical adjustment in expectations as the initial shock begins to wear off. (The “Overton window” shifts in directions that had previously been unimagined.)

Many analysts have adopted the interpretation that Trump follows a deliberate negotiating strategy. He is said to stake out an extreme position, not because he necessarily expects to get everything that he asks for, but rather as a negotiating tactic, a base from which he plans in the future to make concessions, in exchange for important concessions by others, thereby achieving a glorious bargain.

This is related to the more general characterization of Trump as “transactional” — a polite way of saying that he makes deals that have short-term benefits (possibly financial benefits to himself), while ignoring longer-term considerations of ethics, credibility, the rule of law, and the larger system. Pundits often cite the love of deal-making revealed in his ghost-written book The Art of the Deal, even though it is not certain that he ever read it, let alone wrote it.

This interpretation imputes too much strategic thinking to Trump. I am not sure that he thinks ahead at all. The pattern that generally fits better than a thought-out negotiating strategy: He likes to declare war, cheered by his supporters; and he eventually declares victory even though the US has gained little.

2. 25 % tariffs against Canada and Mexico

Trump initially announced the 25% tariffs on the neighbors soon after his inauguration, in violation of his earlier US-Mexico-Canada Agreement, not to mention the WTO. This was not a move that he had campaigned on, having emphasized rather China and other trading partners as the primary targets for tariff threats. On February 4, he suddenly postponed the tariffs for 30 days. At the same time, a further tariff of 10% against Chinese imports, an “opening salvo,” did go into effect, as did retaliation from Beijing. On March 4, the tariffs against Canada and Mexico went into effect, as well as another 10% against China. Today, as I write, the White House is once again talking about exemptions, suspensions, and postponements. 

If the on-again off-again tariffs are kept on for long, they will seriously damage, not just Canada and Mexico, but the US economy as well. read more

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Trump threatens tariffs against a BRICs chimera

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December 20, 2024 — In 2023, the leaders of Brazil and other BRICS countries – Russia, India, China, and South Africa – began to discuss the creation of a new common currency.   At a BRICS summit meeting two months ago, they continued to talk up the currency proposal.  New members as of this year, Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran and the United Arab Emirates would presumably also be included.

The idea is to encourage a shift in the global monetary system away from dominance of the dollar, which has held sway the last 75 years.  This has provoked President-elect Donald Trump.  On November 30, 2024, he reiterated a warning to the BRICS that he required “a commitment from these Countries that they will neither create a new BRICS Currency nor back any other Currency to replace the mighty US Dollar, or they will face 100% Tariffs.”

It is interesting that Trump accepted at face-value the proposition that the BRICs might indeed create a new currency, if not stopped by him.  Such a development does not stand the ghost of a chance of happening, regardless of what Trump says or does. (Below we will consider a more general increase in the use of other currencies in place of the dollar to invoice trade, denote financial transactions, and so forth, which is indeed already underway, albeit at a very slow speed so far.)

  1. The tariff weapon

The threat of 100% tariffs comes on top of Trump threats of 25% tariffs against Mexico and Canada, if they don’t stop the smuggling of fentanyl into the US, which in turn follows his threats of 60% tariffs against China and 10 % or 20% for all other trading partners, whether the US has signed a free trade agreement with them or not.  Trump’s tariff threats begin to look like a madman wildly brandishing of a gun in the street. It persuades passersby to make wide circles around him but does not lead to one of Trump’s self-described successful “transactions.”

Trump is widely said to be transactions-focused.  But it is not always clear what is the transaction.   Trading partners do not have it in their power to eliminate the US trade  deficit with them.  Mexico does not have it in its power to stop the smuggling of fentanyl into the US.  Trump has used the tariff threat to demand both of those impossible concessions.

  1. The BRICs currency is a chimera

Why is there not the ghost of a chance of the BRICs creating their own currency?    If the new unit is meant to exist alongside their national currencies, it will not gain traction.  For an international currency to be successful, it must have a home base.  That is why the English language is the world’s lingua franca and Esperanto is not.  It is why the special drawing right (SDR) – the International Monetary Fund’s reserve asset, whose value is based on a basket of major currencies – has not been successful as an international currency.

To offer a successful international unit, then, the BRICs would need to form a currency union, where each gives up its own currency and they establish a pan-BRICS central bank to manage the new currency, especially to agree on how they should be issued.

Most members of successful monetary unions, even if they are sovereign countries, tend to be small economies that are open to trade among themselves, and that share common goals, geographic proximity, correlated business cycles, and a relatively integrated labor market.  If their economies are very different from each other, there will be times when one goes into recession while another overheats. In a monetary union, each has given up the ability to set its own monetary supply, interest rates and currency value in response to such cyclical fluctuations.  In that case, they had better possess alternate ways of adjusting, such as the movement of labor (from high unemployment countries to low-unemployment), and have sufficient political commitment to the monetary union to withstand fluctuations.

Examples include the CFA zones in Africa, which mostly include the French-speaking countries, and the Eastern Caribbean currency union,  English-speaking islands.  These are very small neighboring countries that share a common language and colonial history.  Probably the largest member is Cote d’Ivoire, with a GDP of $ 87 billion, smaller in economic size than Buffalo, NY.

The exception is of course the twenty members of the euro zone.  But, while many of them have relatively big GDPs, they share common borders and an integrated economy.  Also, they share a common commitment to the idea of a Europe that is unified, integrated and peaceful.  Even so, the economies of the UK, Sweden and Norway are sufficiently removed from the continent that these three countries have no interest in joining the euro.  And when a country like Greece does join, it has had a hard time fitting into the monetary straitjacket of the euro.

Some regional groupings of countries have long discussed the possibility of adopting a common currency.   The Arab oil states of the Persian Gulf got the furthest.  In 2001, the six members of the Gulf Cooperation Council decided to form a currency union by 2010.  But 2010 came and went, with no progress toward a currency union.  Even such small, culturally aligned, and cyclically correlated countries as the GCC members are not in fact willing to give up their individual monetary sovereignty.

The five BRICS countries are large and geographically dispersed, let alone the expanded membership.   They speak different languages. Even where they share a common border, it has been the source of military conflict rather than economic integration.   (Soldiers of China and India fought each other on the border in Ladakh in June 2020.)   The correlation of the business cycle across the economies is relatively low.   For example, when global oil prices are high, Russia, Brazil, Iran and the UAE are boosted, while China and India are held back.  And vice versa.   The BRICS are far less well-suited to a monetary union than are the GCC countries.

  1. The threat could backfire

To be sure, a gradual movement among international currencies away from the dollar is already discernible.  It has been very slow.  But it has been given extra impetus in recent years by the more frequent American use of financial sanctions (including, since 2018, against Iran even though it had been abiding by the 2015 nuclear agreement).  For example, some central banks have shifted part of their international reserves out of dollars, most notably Russia after it seized Crimea in 2014.

But if the US were to attack the BRICS countries in a Trumpian temper tantrum of 100% tariffs, it could backfire.  It could accelerate decisions to shift out of dollars, into the yuan and smaller currencies, and (in the case of international reserves), into gold.

Another respect in which clumsy efforts to promote international use of the dollar could be at cross-purposes with other Trump goals is his oft-repeated desire to help improve the US trade balance by seeing the dollar depreciate against the renminbi and currencies of other countries that run bilateral surpluses with the US.  Talking down the dollar would be consistent with Trump’s threats to the independence of the Federal Reserve and the other inflationary policies that he proposes.  But currencies that are known to suffer from inflation and depreciation are not attractive as international currencies.

It seems that Trump views tariffs as the solution to every problem in international relations.  But he is in danger of applying the threat so indiscriminately that it loses effectiveness.

[An earlier version appeared at Project Syndicate and the Guardian.  Comments can be posted at Econbrowser.]

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Let China Pay the Cost of Solar Energy and Electric Vehicles

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June 28, 2024 — Lethal heat waves this month hit the US and other regions throughout the Northern hemisphere, including India and the eastern Mediterranean.  June will probably mark the 13th consecutive month of average global temperatures that exceed all observations in records going back to 1850.  The primary explanation is, of course, that emissions and concentrations of Greenhouse Gases (GHGs) have in recent years increased even more rapidly than had been feared.

  1. A pleasant surprise

In one area, however, progress in the fight against global climate change has been greater than had been expected.  Use of solar power and other sources of renewable energy in the US and the European Union has risen rapidly.  The beginnings of an historic shift from internal combustion engines to electricpowered vehicles (EVs) have multiplied the importance of the switch to solar and wind sources of electric power.

The demand for renewable energy and EVs has been stimulated by big drops in the real prices of solar panels, wind turbines, batteries, and EVs. In the US, one factor underlying the shift has been subsidies to clean energy, particularly solar, wind, and EVs, in President Joe Biden’s Inflation Reduction Act, which was signed in 2022, with further details announced June 18, 2024. An even bigger factor, however, has been declines in the world prices of solar panels and EVs driven substantially by Chinese exports.  Worryingly, recent expansions in the US and EU of tariffs on imports of environmentally beneficial equipment threaten to derail this progress.

While numbers for the cost of the energy transition are inherently slippery, the global capital investment needs in the power sector alone are estimated at $1.3 trillion per year on average between 2021 and 2050.   Western countries have demanded that China bear its fair share of the costs.  Yet, their trade policies are starkly at odds with the stated objectives.

  1. New import barriers

The perversely disproportionate targeting of imports of renewable energy equipment by the US and EU goes back more than ten years.  But it has gotten worse under the Trump and Biden Administrations.

On May 14, the US White House announced its decision (under a “section 301” trade remedy) to raise tariffs sharply on many imports from China, including solar cells, lithium-ion batteries, and electric vehicles, the last to a prohibitive 100%.  Such protection will make it difficult to achieve Biden Administration targets which call  for EVs to constitute half of all new cars sold by 2030 and for clean energy to constitute 100 percent of power generation by 2035.

New US tariffs are also aimed at other trading partners. Some production of photo-voltaic cells has shifted from China to Southeast Asia, in response both to rising costs in China and to tariffs imposed by the US and EU.  In response, the US International Trade Commission recently decided, in a June 7 vote, to pursue claims by some US solar manufacturers who seek anti-dumping and countervailing duty protection against producers in Southeast Asia.  This move comes despite opposition from US firms that buy the equipment as inputs to their business of developing and operating solar energy domestically.

Meanwhile, on June 12, the European Commission announced provisional tariffs on Chinese-made EVs, to take effect in July, in response to unfair subsidies.  The new EU tariffs, while not prohibitive, average 31 %, substantially higher than those on its imports of conventional autos from other trading partners.

  1. Macroeconomic goals

It is true that Chinese prices of solar panels and EVs are low not just because of low labor costs and economies of scale, but also because of government subsidies, e.g., in the form of cheaper credit.   This leads most American and European politicians to support the blocking of these cheap exports.  But why do they want to charge the cost of clean-energy subsidies to their own taxpayers (or their national debts), in place of charging the cost to Chinese taxpayers?  Remember, they wanted China to pay its fair share of the cost of fighting climate change.

Logically, one could even imagine that Western governments might have refused to subsidize the energy transition unless the Chinese government did so as well!  But nobody thinks this way.

It may well be that selling climate policy by its capacity for creating green jobs that are reserved for domestic workers is the most feasible strategy politically.  But we should recognize that the argument is indeed political, not economic.

For one thing, green jobs created in the industry that manufactures solar panels are offset by green jobs lost in the sector that installs solar energy, which depends on low-cost equipment for its dynamism.  Similarly, green jobs in EV production are lost when tariffs lead to higher prices for imports of batteries.  Furthermore, export jobs of all sorts are lost when China or other trading partners retaliate against import restrictions.

Anyway, with US unemployment at 4 %, inflation is the primary concern these days, not employment. Removing the tariffs is the surest way that Western governments could have a downward impact on prices of energy and transportation, and thereby on inflation.  Yet another respect in which international trade could lower the costs of the green transition, if we were to let it.

[An earlier version appeared at Project Syndicate and the Guardian. Comments can be posted at Econbrowser.]

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