Category Archives: fiscal stimulus

A Few Tax Policy Suggestions for Our New President

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Three areas that President Obama will have to address during his term in office are the recession, energy and the environment, and the long-run fiscal outlook.    The recession is the most urgent.  But the long-run fiscal outlook will be the most difficult.   Social Security and Medicare would have made addressing the long-run fiscal outlook difficult in any case.  (Did you know that the first baby-boomers are starting to draw Social Security this year?)   The Bush tax cuts of 2001 and 2003 made it worse.  The rapid spending increases of the last eight years made it still worse.   The financial crisis and recession are now making it still worse.  To be clear, fiscal stimulus today is appropriate, given the weak economy.  The trick is to combine it with the minimum damage to future budgets.   
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Restructuring the International Financial System: A New Bretton Woods?

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The members of the G-20 are meeting in Washington on November 15 to discuss reform of the global financial system.  The first thing to say about the calls for a “new Bretton Woods” is that they overreach, in the sense that it is very unlikely that any changes in the structure of the international monetary or financial system will or should, at this point in history, come out of multilateral discussions that are big enough to merit comparison with the first Bretton Woods. Certainly we are not talking about fixing exchange rates, as the 1944 meeting did. read more

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Contradictions of Supply-Side Economics Live on in Washington

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Politicians have always faced the temptation to give their constituents tax cuts.    But in recent decades “conservative” presidents have enacted large tax cuts that have been anything but conservative fiscally, and have justified them by appealing to theory.   In particular, they have appealed to two theories:   the Laffer Proposition, which says that cuts in tax rates will pay for themselves via higher economic activity, and the Starve the Beast Hypothesis, which says that tax cuts will increase the budget deficit and put downward pressure on federal spending.     It is insufficiently remarked that the two propositions are inconsistent with each other:   reductions in tax rates can’t increase tax revenues and reduce tax revenues at the same time.    But being mutually exclusive does not prevent them both from being wrong.
   
The Laffer Proposition, while theoretically possible under certain conditions, does not apply to US income tax rates:  a cut in those rates reduces revenue, precisely as common sense would indicate.    As detailed in a new paper of mine “Snake-Oil Tax Cuts,”  for the Economic Policy Institute, this conclusion was the outcome of the two big experiments of recent decades: the Reagan tax cuts of 1981-83 and the Bush tax cuts of 2001-03.   It is also the conclusion of more systematic scholarly studies based on more extensive data.    Finally, it is the view of almost all professional economists, including the illustrious economic advisers to Presidents Reagan and Bush, even though it contradicted the views of their employers.  So thorough is the discrediting of the Laffer Hypothesis, that many deny that these two presidents or their top officials could have ever believed such a thing.   But abundant quotes  show that they did.

The Starve the Beast Hypothesis claims that politicians can’t spend money that they don’t have.  In theory, Congressmen are supposedly inhibited from increasing spending by constituents’ fears that the resulting deficits will mean higher taxes for their grandchildren.     The theory fails on both conceptual grounds and empirical grounds.   Conceptually, one should begin by asking: what it the alternative fiscal regime to which Starve the Beast is being compared?     The natural alternative is the regime that was in place during the 1990s, which I call Shared Sacrifice.    During that time, any congressman wishing to increase spending had to show how they would raise taxes to pay for it.   Logically, a Congressman contemplating a new spending program to benefit some favored supporters will be more inhibited by fears of constituents complaining about an immediate tax increase (under the regime of Shared Sacrifice) than by fears of constituents complaining that budget deficits might mean higher taxes many years into the future (under Starve the Beast).   Sure enough, the Shared Sacrifice approach of the 1990s succeeded.  Compare this outcome to the sharp increases in spending that took place when President Reagan took office, when the first President Bush took office, and when the second President Bush took office.    As with the Laffer Hypothesis, more systematic econometric analysis confirms the rejection of the hypothesis.

 These matters are not solely of interest to historians or economists.   The presidential campaign of Senator John McCain appears set to drive its wagon down the same road in which Reagan and Bush have already worn deep ruts.   The candidate is apparently selling the same snake oil:  he says he believes that tax cuts increase revenues.   His principle policy director disavows the Laffer Principle, just as the economists who advised Presidents Reagan and Bush did.   But the views of the economic advisers are not what determines what these presidents do. 

“The Queen in Alice in Wonderland  said that, with practice, she was able to believe as many as six impossible things before breakfast.   Most of us are more limited in our capacity for credulity.  If John McCain believes both the Laffer Proposition (tax cuts raise revenues) and Starve the Beast (higher revenues lead to higher spending, anathema to conservatives), then as a good conservative, his duty is clear.  He ought to run on a truly novel platform of higher tax rates!   Why?   Higher tax rates would reduce revenues (this is what Laffer says would happen) and thereby reduce spending (this is what Starve the Beast says would happen).   
    
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